



U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

AUG 13 2019

Shawn Musgrave  
MuckRock News  
DEPT MR 14877  
411A Highland Avenue  
Somerville, MA 02144-2516

Re: Freedom of Information Act Appeal, No. 20160003

Dear Mr. Musgrave:

Reference is made to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeal received by the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) on June 7, 2019, appealing the FOIA exemptions claimed in the documents provided.

Your appeal has been granted. Upon review, it has been determined that additional information is available for release. A copy of the document containing this information are enclosed. Some information continues to be withheld, however, under the Freedom of Information Act.

Some of the information contained in the enclosed document is redacted pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section (b)(7)(E) because release of this information could disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or could disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

The document also contains information which is being withheld in whole or in part by Title 5, United States Code, Section 552(b)(5) as “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” This exemption protects documents involved in the decision making of the Executive Branch.

Under federal law, we are required to advise you that any decision on appeal is subject to judicial review in the district court in the district where the complainant resides, has a principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Leonza Newsome III".

Leonza Newsome III  
Deputy Director

Enclosures

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***United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel  
(USSSPMP)***

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*Joseph Hagan, Thomas Perrelli, Danielle Gray, Mark Filip*

*Report from the  
United States Secret Service  
Protective Mission Panel  
to the  
Secretary of Homeland Security*

**DECEMBER 15, 2014**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The paramount mission of the United States Secret Service—protecting the President and other high-ranking national officials—allows no tolerance for error. A single misstep, or even a split-second delay, could have disastrous consequences for the Nation and the world. The men and women of the Secret Service fulfill one of the most important obligations in this country, and they do so often with no personal recognition, no desire for fame, and modest compensation. We know special agents of the United States Secret Service as the silent figures around the President, but we tend to notice them only in the extraordinarily rare moments when they fail. Most Americans know little of the work of the Secret Service's Uniformed Division and do not realize that it is the Uniformed Division that plays a primary role in the protection of the White House.

Throughout its work, the Protective Missions Panel (“the Panel”) developed an even greater appreciation than each of us had previously for the work of the Secret Service. From our meetings at the highest levels of the Secret Service, to meetings with line agents and officers, we saw individuals who were unwavering in their passion and dedication to duty. In discussions with others inside and outside of the U.S. government, including other law enforcement agencies and the U.S. military, there was agreement that, when it comes to providing personal protection to a chief executive and others, the Secret Service is without peer. Facing constant threats and charged with guarding the world’s most powerful and visible head of state and the most accessible executive mansion of any large nation, the Secret Service has an extraordinary track record of success. This is not to say that the Secret Service does not make mistakes. But we owe the agents, officers, and line personnel of the Secret Service a debt of gratitude.

For an organization that has a zero-failure mission, however, a commitment to constant improvement and a refusal to compromise are essential. The Secret Service must be prepared to face every evolving threat in a rapidly changing environment and to stay constantly ahead of those who could threaten the White House, the President, and other protectees—including the First Family, the Vice-President, and foreign heads of state. That central mission requires a dynamic organization that constantly evaluates its performance and seeks to improve, with leaders able to take the agency to that higher level of performance. It requires personnel who are not only committed to the mission and of great character and ability, but who are also highly trained and innovative. And it requires deployment of the best available technology to augment the talents and training of the men and women of the Secret Service.

This Panel was formed following recent incidents indicating certain lapses in the Secret Service’s performance. Most immediately, on September 19, 2014, an individual climbed over the fence on the north side of the White House and sprinted past members of the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division and into the White House. Although fence jumpers are a relatively regular occurrence at the compound, no one had ever made it so far. It is important to note that the President and First Family were not at the White House, and there was never any risk to them. Nonetheless, no unauthorized person—armed or not, mentally ill or not—should ever reach the interior of the White House. The men and women we spoke to within the Secret Service, current and past, unanimously agreed that what happened on September 19 can never happen again.

The lapses that led to the events of September 19, 2014, have been set forth in detail by a report prepared by Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, aided by General Counsel Stevan Bunnell ("the Mayorkas Report"). The Mayorkas Report, which makes specific findings related to the September 19 events, provides a crucial backdrop to this Report and should be read in tandem with it. This Panel's mandate was not to redo the Mayorkas Report, but to accept its findings and undertake a broader review of the Secret Service's protection of the White House compound.


Our review and recommendations are set forth in detail below, and they fall within three general areas: training and personnel; perimeter security, technology, and operations; and leadership. A number of the recommendations go directly to issues highlighted by the events of September 19. Among other things, the Panel believes strongly that the fence around the White House needs to be changed as soon as possible to provide better protection. We recognize all of the competing considerations that may go into questions regarding the fence, but believe that protection of the President and the White House must be the higher priority. Every additional second of response time provided by a fence that is more difficult to climb makes a material difference in ensuring the President's safety, protecting the symbol that is the White House, and minimizing the number of times that a Uniformed Division officer has to make a fateful decision about whether lethal force is appropriate. As the Executive Branch, Congress, and the Service itself have all recognized, the fence must be addressed immediately.

But the problems exposed by recent events go deeper than a new fence can fix. The Panel thus looked more broadly at the Service, recognizing that issues affecting the Service's protective operations more generally have their greatest impact on protection of the White House and President. Of the many concerns the Panel encountered, the question of leadership is, in our view, the most important. [REDACTED]


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This Report attempts to quantify the additional personnel needed, but the Panel has been hamstrung to some extent by the lack of complete data. Put simply, the Service does not have systems in place to make the most prudent budgeting choices. Like so many agencies, the Service has, for years, looked at its base budget and tried to ballpark how much more it might be able to get through the OMB and congressional processes. The result, however, is that no one has really looked at how much the mission, done right, actually costs. That is why one of our most important recommendations is that a new director start with a zero-based budget. Forget about what the Service has asked for in the past: Define the mission, and make the argument to policy makers in the Executive Branch and Congress that this sum—which we believe to be more than current appropriations—is needed.

Finally, the Panel reviewed a variety of physical security and operational issues at the White House; in Part VI, the Panel makes a number of recommendations about the ongoing security of the compound. Aspects of this discussion are classified, and the Panel believes strongly that operational issues related to the protection of the White House should not be the subject of detailed public discussion in this Report or any other fora.

\* \* \*

Many of the recommendations set forth below are not new. Indeed, some of them precisely echo recommendations that the White House Security Review made in 1995 (“1995 Security Review”) but that remain concerns today. Others even harken back to recommendations made in the Warren Commission Report following the assassination of President Kennedy. And still others track internal recommendations made by the Service. As the Secret Service itself has recognized, the Service has often made recommendations and proposed solutions as it identified problems, but has often failed to implement its own recommendations.

Some of the changes address isolated problems, with well-defined options to solve them, while others will require far more study by, we hope, a dynamic, new management team that will lead the Service into the future. Following September 19, the Service began implementing a number of reforms, and those efforts have continued alongside the Panel’s work.

Finally, the Panel recognizes that many of these recommendations will be difficult. Many will cost money, which is always a challenge in Washington D.C. We are mindful of the current budget climate and the value of taxpayer dollars, and we would not recommend spending a penny unwisely.

Many others will require strong leadership and a will to change, which can be difficult for an organization with such a storied history. Some in the Secret Service will resist and may need to move on. But the Secret Service cannot lose focus on its core and essential mission: the protection of the current, past, and future Presidents of the United States. As a nation, we should

not fail to make prudent investments in personnel, technology, and leadership when the stakes are so high.

## II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROTECTIVE MISSIONS PANEL

On September 19, 2014, a 42-year-old named Omar Gonzalez, wearing foam, clog-like sandals, climbed over the North Fence of the White House. Gonzalez had previously come to the attention of both state and federal authorities, including the Secret Service, and had been observed a few weeks earlier carrying a hatchet in the vicinity of the White House complex. Twenty-nine seconds after he had scaled the fence, Gonzalez entered the White House, untouched. Secret Service foot patrols outside the fence, an Emergency Response Team and canine unit on the North Lawn, officers posted both inside and outside the building at the North Portico, and the White House doors themselves failed to stop Gonzalez's entry. He was detained forty seconds after entering the building, when Secret Service officers and agents who were between posts and shifts engaged Gonzalez and brought him down. Although the President and First Family were away from the building, and although the event happened when the normally bustling office complex was heading into a weekend, the fact that Gonzalez breached the White House was itself damaging to the Secret Service and its primary mission.

Following the incident, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson ordered two separate reviews. First, he ordered Deputy Secretary Mayorkas to review the September 19 incident. The Mayorkas Report was completed on November 1, 2014, and was based on scores of interviews, conducted by a large team of agents and lawyers, and a thorough investigation.

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The Report makes a number of findings about what happened that night, but it does not—and was not asked to—make broader recommendations of how to improve the security of the White House compound.

That task was left to this Panel. On October 1, Secretary Johnson issued the following statement:

*I have ... determined that scrutiny by a distinguished panel of experts of the September 19 incident and related issues concerning the Secret Service is warranted... By December 15 2014, this panel will submit to me its own assessment and recommendations concerning security of the White House compound. I will also invite the panel to submit to me recommendations for potential new directors of the Secret Service, to include recommendations of individuals who come from outside the Secret Service. I will also request that the panel advise me about whether it believes, given the series of recent events, there should be a review of broader issues concerning the Secret Service. The security of the White House compound should be the panel's primary and immediate priority.*

Subsequently, by an October 15, 2014 memorandum, Secretary Johnson appointed the panelists. The operative federal register called the Panel's work "time-sensitive" and identified three objectives:

*To review the recent fence jumping incident at the White House on September 19 2014, and related issues concerning security at the White House compound; to provide recommendations for potential new directors of the Secret Service; and to recommend whether there should be a broader review of the Secret Service*

The DHS notice also acknowledged that the Panel's work would require it to discuss sensitive, classified, and deliberative information that, "if discussed in public, would result in the unauthorized disclosure of information that could reasonably be expected to result in threats or damage to national security." The Secretary thus invoked his authority to establish the Panel as an advisory committee pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 451(a).

- The Panel immediately began reviewing documents, receiving briefings, and identifying a list of persons to be interviewed. The Panel enjoyed full cooperation from the Secret Service, DHS, and the White House, as well as numerous other state and federal agencies and individuals who offered their time and insight into a multitude of issues. The Panel thanks Acting Director Joe Clancy for this cooperation and for all that he has already done to put the Secret Service back on the right course. We also met with approximately 50 employees of the Secret Service itself—officers and agents currently in service, junior and mid-level managers and Assistant Directors, officials from headquarters and field offices, agency leadership, and a number of the agency's past directors and other former agents.

The Panel felt it was critical to receive extensive information from experts outside the Service who were engaged in missions similar to the Service, had expertise in management of law enforcement or security agencies, or were involved in the development or deployment of protective technology. Ultimately, the Panel met with over 120 representatives and leaders from a broad array of federal agencies and research facilities, as well as with representatives of major metropolitan police and security forces. Among government agencies alone, in addition to Secret Service and White House personnel, the Panel met with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; the Department of Defense's Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate and Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation Security Division and Washington Field Office; from within the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, Federal Protective Service, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Office of the General Counsel, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Operations, Coordination, and Planning, the Science and Technology Directorate's Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Transportation Security Administration; the U.S. Marine Corps; the U.S. Marshal Service; the U.S. Navy; the U.S. Park Police; the Pentagon Force Protection Agency; Sandia National Laboratories; and the Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. From outside of the federal government, the Panel met with, among others, local law enforcement that often partners with the Secret Service, including the Los Angeles Police Department, New York Police Department, and Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department.

### **III. SCOPE OF THE REPORT**

This Report considers the physical security of the White House compound, but also issues that extend beyond mere physical security, in the most literal sense of the phrase, that have very concrete consequences for the President's and the compound's protection. Issues of leadership and management, organizational culture, and training may seem less directly tied to security than, for example, the height of the fence, and they may implicate issues that sweep across the agency. But where those issues affect the security of the White House compound, our mission requires that we address them.]

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Some aspects of the protection of the White House lay outside the Panel's mandate. The protection of the White House has many layers, and could be defined to include all of the efforts of America's intelligence community, military, law enforcement, and other agencies involved in the protection of the homeland. A threat is best defused if it never comes anywhere near the White House. We have not sought to review the many and varied efforts of these other agencies to avert or respond to threats against our country that could also harm the White House and the President. Similarly, the Panel's focus has not been on agencies that provide support to the Secret Service, for example, by sharing intelligence with the Service. The Panel also did not seek to evaluate the White House from a counter-intelligence perspective or vulnerability to cyber-attack, as our focus was on the physical security of the compound. Finally, the Panel generally did not seek to make specific technical recommendations, such as which precise technology to acquire, believing such decisions are better left to thorough testing and review by the Service.

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### **IV. THE WHITE HOUSE COMPOUND**

#### **A. The Nature and Physical Scope of the Compound**

The White House is a complex environment. It is, at once, a seat of government, a home, an office building, a convention center, a museum, and a venerated symbol. Compared to other executive residences around the world, the White House is remarkably open—both visually and

in terms of public access. The White House is not a military compound with walls to hide it from view. Every American can visit the White House, see it, and come remarkably close to the President's residence. With a little advance planning, most are able to tour the White House, within feet of both the entrance to the residence and the West Wing offices where decisions affecting the lives of all Americans are made. On select days of the year, such as the Easter Egg Roll, thousands of people stream through the White House grounds. And as we have witnessed repeatedly in recent days, the area outside the White House is often a focal point of First Amendment activity and protest. It is truly the People's House.

Because the Panel's charge was to focus on "the security of the White House compound," it is important to understand the compound's boundaries. For purposes of this Report, we considered security issues arising in the area bounded by H Street NW to the North, Constitution Avenue NW to the South, and 15th and 17th Streets NW to the East and West, respectively. Functionally, this area includes all of the White House grounds, including the mansion itself, the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, and the Treasury Department. It includes the North Lawn, the South Lawn, and the Ellipse, as well as Pennsylvania Avenue NW and Lafayette Square. Although these boundaries extend modestly beyond the fence that marks the outline of the White House compound proper, it is impossible to consider the security of the area *inside* the fence without looking at what happens immediately on the other side of it. A map of the White House Complex and Surrounding Area is contained at Figure 1.




Figure 1: Map of White House Complex and Surrounding Area  
Source: Secret Service

## **B. Jurisdiction over the Physical Area**

The White House compound is subject to a complex web of jurisdictional authorities. Both federal and local authorities have a role. The Secret Service has jurisdiction over relevant areas inside the fence, the Department of the Interior's United States Park Police has jurisdiction over the sidewalk immediately outside the fence, and the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department has jurisdiction over Pennsylvania Avenue—an authority that has survived from the avenue's days as a traffic-carrying street, before it was closed in 1995 in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing. Across Pennsylvania Avenue is Lafayette Square, a public park that is also under the jurisdiction of the Park Police. To sum it up: In the space of a few yards, jurisdiction transfers from the Secret Service to the Park Police, to the Metropolitan Police Department, and back to the Park Police.

While these lines of authority are not necessarily how someone might design the law enforcement scheme around a facility that needs to maintain the highest security, they seem to function adequately. In previous years, there were regular reports of jurisdictional or operational squabbling among the agencies. Memoranda of Understanding were entered to define the joint and individual responsibilities. Today, representatives of all three agencies indicated that operationally, the system seems to work fine, and they no longer see major causes for concern.

## **C. Protection of the White House Complex**

Two components of the Secret Service have the primary role for the protection of the White House.<sup>1</sup> Although the public's image of the Secret Service is that of the stoic special agent standing immediately behind the President, the Uniformed Division ("UD") is the compound's first and primary line of defense. The Uniformed Division is larger than the population of agents assigned to protection, and its resources are predominantly located in Washington D.C. The UD includes the officers who control access to and patrol the White House complex and the Vice President's residence; the Emergency Response Teams, which are often the first responders to situations at the White House; a Counter-Sniper Team; and a Foreign Missions Branch, which patrols Washington, D.C. neighborhoods housing foreign government embassies and protect these embassy buildings. The UD's presence is greatest at the White House, whether the President is there or not, but its members also travel around the world to operate magnetometers, provide counter-sniper coverage, and deploy canine units at events involving the President and other protectees.

The special agents of the Presidential Protective Division ("PPD") are assigned to the President's personal protection. When the President is at the White House, protection of the compound and protection of the President, while not one and the same, are highly interrelated. Special agents are hired through a separate process and have a different career path than UD officers. Special agents begin their careers working on the Secret Service's investigative mission, investigating financial crimes from a field office and working closely with local, state, and federal prosecutors; during that time, special agents get occasional exposure to the agency's protective mission—such as when a protectee comes to town and the protectee's detail needs

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reinforcement from the local office, or on domestic or international trips of protees—but new special agents primarily spend their time developing investigative skills and law enforcement instincts.

After approximately four-to-six years of this work, agents are typically transferred to Washington, D.C. to begin a roughly five-year stint with the agency's protective operations that often ends with a shift on the President's or Vice-President's detail. These are the agents who, on the road, are seen working the President through rope lines and other public events. Agents assigned to protection also staff Counter-Assault Teams, support operations and logistics requirements, run the transportation section, and maintain liaison with other presidential support units.

For PPD, proximity is critical; when a threat approaches the President, their trained response is to "cover and evacuate." While others, such as the Counter-Assault Team and the Uniformed Division, may respond to or counterattack an individual or group that poses a threat, PPD's focus is on the President. The legend that "they would take a bullet" for the President is not just a catchphrase. It is their job description, and they perform it better than any similar force in the world.

Managing the Secret Service's White House team is particularly complex, even by the standards of the Service's already complex organizational chart. The Special Agent-in-Charge ("SAIC") of PPD has perhaps the most significant job in the entire Secret Service and enormous influence, but is buried in the organization chart under multiple layers of management. The Uniformed Division in the White House Branch and agents in the Presidential Protective Division administratively report to different managers in the Secret Service hierarchy, but the SAIC has operational command and control of both PPD agents and UD officers at the White House. Over the years, the Secret Service has considered or experimented with different structures.

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## V. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL

The Panel spent significant time on issues related to staffing and training. The most common refrain that the Panel heard from all sources within the Service, from line agents and officers to the director, from special agents to UD officers, is that the Service is overstretched, with personnel working far too many hours. The result, according to all, is an exhausted work force with low morale.

The Panel agrees that the Service has insufficient personnel deployed in its protective operations; below, we set forth our recommendations concerning immediate staffing and budget

issues. We begin our analysis, however, with training, which we believe is a key driver of staffing decisions and a critical need for the Service.

### A. Training

Protecting the President, the First Family, and the White House involves endless preparation, constant vigilance, and split-second reaction. We expect the special agents on protective details and UD officers to be hyper-vigilant for long shifts, day-after-day, when nothing happens—and then, to respond perfectly the instant one of many potential threats appears. The task is always demanding, sometimes tedious, and wholly unforgiving of error. A momentary distraction or loss of focus, even for a few seconds, could have devastating consequences for the country.

Because Secret Service personnel must respond to unexpected situations that arise rarely, but involve high stakes, vigilance is not enough. Secret Service officers and agents must also have well-honed instincts. As one former director put it, “They need to make police judgments, not consult a checklist.” In this environment in which seconds matter, they do not have the luxury of deliberation; rather, they need to react immediately and decisively.

This is especially true in the context of the White House compound. The 18 Acres is not a militarized zone, does not have the standoff that security professionals might prefer, and cannot be surrounded by barriers that would do violence to its symbol as the People’s House. As the events of September 19 demonstrated, a person, once over the fence, can be at the residence in a matter of seconds. To defeat the solo fence jumper, to say nothing of more complex threats or coordinated attacks, every member of the Secret Service in affected posts has to act instantly and in concert.

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#### 1. Availability of In-Service Training

Secret Service agents and UD officers receive their initial, general law enforcement training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (“FLETC”) in Glynco, GA, and then receive mission-specific courses at the Secret Service’s Rowley Training Center in Beltsville, Maryland. Agents who move to protective details after four-to-six years of investigative work receive an initial 100+ hours of specialized training prior to starting their protective mission. Beyond this initial training, however, Secret Service agents and officers need ongoing, constant, high-level training to maintain the levels of vigilance and skills that the job requires.

Almost three decades ago, the Secret Service developed an approach to ensuring that members of the Presidential Protective Division were always at the height of readiness. In 1985, the Service added a new training component, called the “Fourth Shift,” to the existing rotations of the President’s detail. More specifically, following two weeks of daytime shifts, two weeks of

afternoons, and two weeks of midnights, agents spent two weeks in training. This "Fourth Shift" training time was used to refresh their skills, practice new tactics, and learn the most current information relevant to their responsibilities. Thus, for two weeks out of every eight, the President's detail was maintaining its strength, practicing, and getting better. While agents were at times diverted for short portions of their Fourth Shift to do advance work on local sites or fulfill other responsibilities, with the Fourth Shift the Service operationalized its commitment to having the most effective, best-trained protective force in the world. The level of training represented in PPD's Fourth Shift approach has served as a model for other protective forces.

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Many other law enforcement and security agencies recognize the importance of the constant, continual approach to training. [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E)

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While some are limited to concentrated training blocks during a week or two per year, the more standard practice among those we talked to is to provide training on an ongoing basis: whether a couple of days per month, a drill during every shift, or ongoing test items (or virtual items) placed into x-rays on a constant basis to maintain skills.<sup>3</sup> The Marines who guard America's most vulnerable embassies abroad drill each of six threat scenarios every quarter, sometimes monthly, helping to keep them sharp. With some outliers in both directions, the protective and law enforcement forces we spoke with tended to range between training 5% of their time (i.e., 80 hours per year) and training 20-25% of their time. [REDACTED]

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The Secret Service mission requires a highly capable, professional force. Giving that force the training that matches the job description would be an important improvement, and likely would have a positive impact on morale.

**Recommendation:** *The Secret Service should be staffed at a level that enables it to provide a true Fourth Shift for training to its protective forces, and to ensure that Uniformed Division officers are in training for no less than 10% of their time.*

## 2. Nature of In-Service Training

It is not enough, however, that the Secret Service trains often; it must also train well. The carefully honed movements and instincts of individual officers and agents have to be well-coordinated with those of their colleagues and tailored to the terrain in which they are operating. The best law enforcement, military, and security teams are just that: teams. They know not only the best trajectory to intercept a subject, but the best trajectory to lead the subject to others who can make the interception. They know when to cover and when to engage, confident of how others on the team will act. They know when they can leave a post to assist, and when they must

remain at a post to see if an initial incident is a decoy. As one former agent explained, security responses are "like a symphony." Teams need to train with the full complement of forces with which they will operate in real life, and the training needs to be provided force-wide, not just to those on duty on the day that training is scheduled.

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**Recommendation:** *The Secret Service should implement integrated training focused on ensuring that all teams at the White House know their roles in responding to specific threats.*

Recommendation:

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## B. Composing the Workforce

In the Panel's view, the need to restore adequate training drives the discussion of staffing, at least in the short-term. The Service must have sufficient staff dedicated to the protection of its protectees and the White House so that it can train at the levels suggested above. As discussed below, the Panel concludes that a significant increase in staffing is required.

### 1. The State of the Workforce

The Panel interviewed dozens of Secret Service personnel, agents and officers, current and former, to assess the current state of the workforce. Without exception, the Panel found a group of dedicated, talented line agents and officers who sacrifice daily to protect the President and the White House. But this group is stretched beyond its limits.

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The Panel sought to go beyond anecdotes and look at the Service's staffing plans and records, but found a comprehensive review to be all but impossible. The Service's system for staffing and tracking its workforce is antiquated. Agents fill out hours reports on a DOS-based system. Agents regularly report working their 8-hour shift and the maximum 2 hours of Law Enforcement Availability Pay (or "LEAP") overtime they are authorized to report, but they do not report how many hours they actually work. Thus, the Service has no systematic way to track exactly how hard its agents are working.

(b)(7)(E)

The Panel recognizes that law enforcement officers regularly work overtime, and the average UD officer has always worked more than a regular 40-hour week. Research of law enforcement agencies shows that officers working *four* ten-hour shifts per week show measurable drops in alertness.<sup>4</sup> But even if the current workload is consistent with historical or other norms, the Panel's fundamental concern remains:

(b)(7)(E)

## 2. The Secret Service over Time

Given the substantial overtime that agents and officers are working and the reported exhaustion of the workforce, the Panel looked at overall staffing of the Service, its components focused on protection and the White House, and certain measures on the scope of its mission.

The Service has grown significantly in the last two decades. Since FY 1995, Secret Service data show that the overall agency is up 37% in terms of personnel. The force protecting the President and White House—i.e., the Presidential Protective Division and the UD's White House Branch—is up 23% over FY 1995 and up 16% over FY 2001.

(b)(7)(E)

<sup>4</sup> Karen L. Amendola et al., "The Impact of Shift Length in Policing on Performance, Health, Quality of Life, Sleep, Fatigue, and Extra-Duty Employment," *A Final Report Submitted to the National Institute of Justice* (Dec. 12, 2011).

(b)(7)(E)

*Source: Secret Service data.*

Of course, while staffing has increased, the mission has also increased dramatically.<sup>5</sup> The Service has continued and expanded its investigative mission, especially in the cyber arena. With respect to protection, the Service is conducting additional protective activities, such as magnetometer screenings at events involving protectees beyond the President. It also has

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<sup>5</sup> Twenty years ago, the 1995 Public Report of the White House Security Review that Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen ordered after a Cessna 105L airplane crashed onto the South Lawn noted that both "the number of personnel [and] the amount of resources committed to its protective mission ... have clearly increased dramatically," because the number of protectees increased over time and their safety was threatened with increasing frequency. See Public Report of the White House Security Review at Chap. 4 (1995) ("One reason for these increases is that a large number of people have been added to the list of Secret Service protectees. . . . Another reason why the Secret Service has elevated the amount of resources and personnel dedicated to its personal protective mission is the fact that its protectees have been subjected to life-threatening assaults with increasing frequency.").

responsibilities for more protees; the United Nations General Assembly continues to bring more heads of state to New York each fall, each of whom requires Secret Service protection. Overall, Secret Service data show that it is now staffing 51% more protective stops per year than it was in FY 1995. The potential threats have also grown in certain meaningful respects, as has the universe of potential counterintelligence.

Moreover, the agency's protective responsibilities are likely to grow in upcoming years. With a 2016 campaign approaching, there is a likelihood of numerous additional candidates requiring protection, and longer campaigns can mean longer periods of protection - on top of the normal stresses that two national political conventions can impose. The Secret Service also needs to stand up additional details as it plans for a new *former* presidential and temporary vice-presidential detail, when the current occupants leave office. The United Nations General Assembly faces its 75<sup>th</sup> Anniversary in 2020, which will attract potentially the largest protective field in history right in the midst of a presidential campaign.

The above blizzard of numbers does not lead to a simple analysis, but the Panel believes that a few pieces of data tell a significant story.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

Both PPD and UD require substantial increases in personnel to allow them to fulfill their essential and increased mandate and to train to be the best protective force in the world.<sup>6</sup>

### 3. The Budget

The Panel's review demonstrates the need for significantly increased staffing at the Secret Service components that protect the White House, both to ensure an alert and ready workforce and to ensure the training that is critical to protection of the President and the White House. Precisely how many resources are needed and where those resources should come from, including whether those resources require new appropriation or diversion from other missions, are more complex questions.

(b)(7)(E)

As discussed below, the Panel has views about the appropriate level of additional staffing required, but precisely defining that need is a significant challenge. To be sure, budgeting for the Service will never be an exact science: the Service cannot predict how much travel the President and other protectees will take, nor when a head of state will visit the United States and require protection. But accepting those conditions, a basic workforce analysis should be achievable—identify the posts that need staffing, predict the necessary advance activity, and calculate the workload that allows for sufficient alertness and training. The model could recognize that variations in travel and visits would cause changes. To date, however, the Secret Service has no real staffing model or system for assessing and evaluating its need. This has been a source of frustration both inside the Executive Branch and in Congress, and is unquestionably related, to some extent, to the Service's antiquated technology systems.

Rather than specifically defining the mission and modeling a corresponding staffing plan, it appears to the Panel that the Service has done what many agencies have done: Look at its base budget from the prior year, triage a few of the worst areas of need, make a prediction about how much additional money DHS, OMB, or Congress might provide, and then pursue those resources. As the agency is stretched to its limit each year, the Service's dedication to duty and sacrifice take over, and it pledges to do the mission with whatever resources are available. While this is an admirable philosophy, it is not an effective way to approach the federal budget process and not the best way to ensure optimal protection for the President and the White House. As time has gone on, the Service's resources and the costs of defending the White House have diverged, resulting in the Service solving short-term problems at the risk of long-term problems, such as paying large amounts of overtime rather than hiring sufficient UD officers, or raiding technology and training funds when campaigns or protectee travel increase.

As discussed below, the Panel recommends that the new director of the Service start over with a zero-based budget. Through such an approach, the director can define the mission, set clear priorities (of which protection should unquestionably be first and paramount), model the staffing needed to fulfill the mission, create a budget, and advocate forcefully for that budget in the Executive Branch and in Congress. We think the President and the White House deserve no less than a serious assessment of what is needed. From its review, the Panel believes that this will entail a significant increase of resources to the Service through the appropriations process. Such an investment, however, in a critical mission, is both small in the context of the DHS budget—let alone the federal budget—and would be sensible and prudent in the context of this mission.

The zero-based budget should take account of, among other things, the expanding protection responsibilities, the increased threat environment, and the need for substantial and ongoing investments in technology. (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

#### 4. Immediate Staffing Needs

A new director's definition of priorities and zero-based budget are long-term solutions to ensuring adequate staffing for the Service. In the short term, however, more resources are desperately needed, and the Panel strongly recommends that Congress and the Executive Branch appropriate funds as soon as possible to address the critical staffing needs of the Service.

The analysis must begin with training. In estimating the immediate need for the Service, the Panel faced the same challenge that will face a new director: internal systems that do not lend themselves to a staffing model. Nonetheless, to meet the goal of modestly bringing down the number of hours that current Uniformed Division officers are working and ensuring that there is adequate time for UD officers to spend at least 10% of their time training, we estimate, UD needs to increase by at least 200 officers. The Panel believes that UD should be funded and start the hiring process immediately so that personnel can receive law enforcement training and come on board as soon as possible.

With respect to the Presidential Protective Division and the other protective details, it is even more difficult to estimate the correct staffing. Moreover, because agents historically serve in the field as investigators before joining PPD, this problem cannot be solved overnight. But the Panel believes that it is critical that a true Fourth Shift be implemented as soon as possible in order to address the critical lack of training. At its most simplistic, that suggests that the Service needs at least 85 new agent positions and the funding to support them; this likely underestimates the need given the potential amount of unrecorded overtime worked and the needs of the other protective details.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) Congress and the Executive should act immediately to increase the Service's staffing and resources, and should watch closely to ensure that additional needs are not going unmet—whether for budgetary reasons or, as discussed in the next section, because the Secret Service has had difficulty bringing people onboard.

**Recommendation:** *The Uniformed Division force should be increased, as quickly as can be appropriately managed, by an initial 200 positions, and the Presidential Protective Division should be similarly increased by 85 positions. Additional analyses and, likely, future increases will be necessary.*

#### 5. Hiring the Workforce

Increasing UD and PPD staffing to the levels described here would be a challenge for any organization, but the Secret Service will face particular difficulties as it brings its staffing into

alignment with its mission. First, even with the most efficient hiring process, there are natural limitations on how swiftly a new recruit can get to his or her post. Both UD officers and new special agents go through extensive law enforcement and mission-specific training before they start, and the Secret Service can typically fit just 24 new hires into each standard training class at FLETC and the Rowley Training Center. Further, it takes approximately seven months to get each recruit through the necessary training. So even once new hires are selected, bringing on hundreds of additional officers and agents could be a multi-year project.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) When the government sequester took effect, the Service made the decision to stop hiring new officers and agents, resulting in a failure to push new classes through training and into the field.

The Service has recently made major changes in its hiring process again, using its "excepted service" authority, like that used by the FBI, to streamline its process and improve its ability to find the most talented available individuals quickly. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

*Recommendation: The Secret Service needs a reformed, professionalized recruiting, hiring, promotion and rotation process that puts the most talented, capable individuals in place as efficiently as possible.*

## **VI. TECHNOLOGY, PERIMETER SECURITY, AND OPERATIONS**

### **A. The Secret Service's Overall Approach to Technology**

Though the Secret Service's most valuable asset is undoubtedly its workforce, technological innovations, when properly leveraged, can provide an important force-multiplying effect. Smart use of technology permits agents and officers to detect, deter, and defeat threats more efficiently. And, as one would expect, the range and sophistication of high-tech tools currently used by the Secret Service is impressive. Generally overseen by the Service's Office of Technical Development and Mission Support, the technological capabilities the Secret Service deploys in and around the White House are significant and add greatly to the security of the White House.

White House technology systems need to ensure that security at the complex is on the cutting edge. But as the range of threats confronted by the Secret Service relentlessly evolves, so too must the Service continually strive to remain at the leading edge of technological innovation.

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

**Recommendation:** *The Secret Service must do more to ensure that its Office of Technical Development and Mission Support proactively reviews and refreshes its technological footprint. The Service should continue to receive dedicated funds for technology, both within its own budget and within DHS Science & Technology's budget, to accomplish these tasks.*

#### **B. The White House Perimeter**

The primary barrier intended to deny the general public access to the White House is a seven-and-a-half-foot-tall iron fence, essentially unaltered since its installation nearly fifty years ago. [REDACTED] Though the

(b)(7)(E)

events of September 19, 2014, drew a large amount of public scrutiny, and rightfully so, the reality is that jumping over this fence has been a regular occurrence for far too long. Nearly twenty years ago, an external panel was commissioned to reassess White House security. That panel noted that: "[i]n recent history, it has been a common occurrence for intruders to scale the fence around the White House Complex and enter the grounds."<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, White House fence-jumping is no less "common" an occurrence today. [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED] (b)(7)(E)

As demonstrated by the events of September 19, the limited height and design of the current fence permit individuals, even those entirely untrained in anything like military-grade tactics, to scale it in a matter of seconds. In fact, most fence-jumpers are not sophisticated adversaries. As the 1995 Security Review noted, most jumpers are relatively harmless, consisting mostly of "pranksters, peaceful protestors, and . . . mentally ill individuals." But the ease with which even these relatively unsophisticated persons can climb over the current fence only underscores its inadequacy to deter more advanced attacks. Moreover, the fact that someone is mentally ill does not mean that that the person cannot, at the same time, be dangerous.

In the course of its work, the Panel talked with many protective security experts, both inside and outside of the government. Many noted that some of our national assets—our laboratories and nuclear facilities, the Pentagon, and other federal buildings—are protected by state of the art fencing with a variety of features that could be incorporated into the White House perimeter. Each and every one was quick to criticize the efficacy of the current fence-line. We concur in their assessment: The current fence, not just along Pennsylvania Avenue but around the compound's entire perimeter, must be replaced as quickly as possible.

[REDACTED] (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED] (b)(7)(E)

A fence worthy of the White House could slow down incoming threats for at least a few additional seconds, thereby giving the Secret Service more chance to react and respond. Additionally, the ease with which "pranksters" and the mentally ill can climb the current fence puts Secret Service personnel in a precarious position: When someone jumps the fence, Secret Service personnel must decide, in a split-second, whether to use lethal force on a person who

<sup>7</sup> Public Report of the White House Security Review at Chap. 4 (1995).

<sup>8</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 1752.

may not actually pose a viable threat to the President or the White House. By deterring these more frivolous threats, a more effective fence can minimize the instances when such difficult decision making is required.

We decline to say precisely what the optimal new fence should look like. Importantly, designers of the new fence must balance security concerns with the long and storied tradition of the White House being the "People's House." In its earliest days, the White House grounds functioned essentially as a national park, the general public free to stroll about. Even today, nearly one million people per year visit the White House on tours, and many millions more capture treasured photographs of it outside the fence. As the 1995 Security Review noted, "First among federal buildings, [the White House] is a national treasure that reflects our unique heritage. ... The openness of the White House to pedestrian visitors is ... distinctive [of that heritage]." It would be easy, and no doubt safer, to transform the White House into a military fort, complete with fifteen-foot concrete walls and twisted, barbed wire overhead. Such a plan, however, would not only clash with the historical surroundings of downtown Washington, but would be anathema to our democracy, of which the White House has become one of the most important symbols.

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

**Recommendation:** *The outer fence that surrounds the 18 Acres must be replaced to give Secret Service personnel more time to react to intrusions.*

### **C. Operations, Tactics, and Intelligence**

This section is classified.

### **D. Weapons and Equipment**

This section is classified.

### **E. Physical Security**

This section is classified.

## **VII. LEADERSHIP**

### **A. Challenges for the New Leader**

The director of the Secret Service always has a difficult job, but the current challenges make the task even harder. Our interviews with current and past Secret Service employees, reviews of classified and unclassified materials produced by the agency, and conversations with individuals from related fields, have led us to offer the following recommendations for management and organizational change—recommendations that affect the Service broadly, but also, in our view, will have a direct impact on the Service's protection of the White House. These challenges set the course for selecting the next director.

#### **1. Establishing Priorities**

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

**Recommendation:** *The Secret Service needs to clearly communicate agency priorities, give effect to those priorities through its actions, and align its operations with its priorities.*

## **2. Reforming Administration**

Agents and officers know what their job requires, believe in the zero-failure mission, and signed up for that responsibility. But the question is whether the organizational structure facilitates their efforts to meet the goal or requires them to overcome the organization. We have come to believe that, at times, Secret Service agents and officers sometimes are asked to succeed *in spite of* organizational bureaucracy and structure, rather than because of it.

Improving the Secret Service's ability to protect the White House compound will require the next director to address a number of administrative and management issues.

#### a. Promoting Specialized Expertise

Secret Service agents and officers are extraordinarily good at what they do: protecting the President and other high-level officials and dignitaries. They are hired for their ability to do that, and they spend years honing those skills. What Secret Service agents are *not* developed or hired to do is build and design technology, develop budgets, build workforce planning models, deal with the media and congressional inquiries, or navigate federal hiring systems.

Unfortunately, however, that is what the Secret Service too often asks these agents to do. Positions that should be filled by individuals with specific administrative experience and expertise are instead filled by special agents on a rotation to headquarters. In an agency in which there are not always enough promotions to go around, the Secret Service, like many law enforcement agencies, has historically promoted law enforcement personnel into administrative leadership positions. The reasons for offering these positions to agents have appeal: First, an agency's administrative staff needs to have intimate understanding of the mission, and no one knows it better than someone who has been on the front lines. Second, organizations want to provide opportunities for its good employees to move up in the ranks and obtain senior executive status, and since managerial positions directly within the protective and investigative chain are limited, opportunities in administrative offices provide slots into which agents can advance. Third, work on the front lines can be taxing; rotating agents into headquarters positions provides them a chance to refresh while they develop further understanding of the organization and mission. The Secret Service's practices here are thus not surprising.

However, filling these important administrative functions with agents rather than professional administrators may not be optimal. At one level, while promoting agents may improve morale by creating opportunities for advancement, it also has fed into a strong perception that the agency relies heavily on an old-boys' network for its management. At a more critical level, if the Secret Service is to remain the best in the world and defeat its adversaries every time, it has to be the best in every facet of the game. An agency that needs the best agents on the front lines needs a hiring process run by human resources experts valued for their specialized knowledge about how to recruit and retain talent, in a timely and efficient manner. An agency that needs to be three steps ahead of those who would do it harm needs more of the best and most innovative scientists and engineers dreaming up ways to defeat the next threat. And an agency that needs to spend every penny wisely needs an administrative department that can demonstrate with rigorous precision why additional resources are necessary and knows how to budget for it.

To offer just one example of the costs today of an old-school administrative approach, the Secret Service's lack of a proper workforce planning model has cost it dearly in the budget process. While some in the agency believe that budgetary problems are the result of leaders who have not fought for resources, it appears to the Panel that a primary issue has been administrative systems that cannot readily be used to justify a request. We are no longer in the days when an

agency with an important mission can demand a financial figure, talk about its protection of the President, and get what it needs. Taxpayer dollars are too precious to spend on mere faith.

Other law enforcement agencies have made this transition to professionalize their operations. The FBI, for example, has placed budgeting, human resources, public relations, and congressional outreach functions all in the hands of expert, experienced "civilian" professionals. And in recent years, one of the Secret Service's sister agencies—Customs and Border Protection—has implemented a reformed workforce staffing model to improve its ability to effectively determine and budget for its personnel needs. Indeed, the workforce staffing model developed by Customs and Border Protection enabled the agency to advocate for and obtain increased funding for port security.

To be fair, the Secret Service does utilize professionals to perform many functions, including a Chief Technology Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and Chief Information Officer. But it still has a ways to go. Except for the Service's General Counsel, all of these civilian professionals report to an assistant director, all of whom are agents, and who themselves report to the Deputy Director. Thus, key leadership and management positions—particularly leadership-level oversight of the agency's budget, human resources (personnel and training), and technology functions—remain essentially in the hands of agents rather than administrative professionals or subject-matter experts. Changes in personnel and administrative systems are critical if the agency is to put its men and women on the front lines in the best possible position to do their jobs.

**Recommendation:** *The Secret Service needs to promote specialized expertise in its budget, workforce, and technology functions.*

#### **b. Budgeting to the Mission**

The federal budget process is a messy one. The budget itself is large and complex, and even the most important program in the country is still a small piece of a massive puzzle. Necessarily, trade-offs are made within components, within agencies, within the Executive Branch, and within congressional committees and chambers. As a result, agencies and components of agencies have to make difficult strategic calculations about how they can get the resources they need.

The federal budget process also starts from a strong presumption towards the status quo. Unless policymakers and national discourse have focused unusual attention on a particular program, for one reason or another and for better or for worse, there are overwhelming forces that push particular line items towards their levels of the previous year. In a good year, components or programs will see a slight increase to keep up with inflation; in a bad year, they often do not even get that.

Agency and component budget directors often keep that context at the forefront of their minds when crafting each year's budget request. In light of the natural inclination to favor the status quo and the tight budgetary climate, budget requests very often begin by looking at last year's budget and end with a request for a small increase over that baseline. They will justify the

increase by looking at growing expenses and increased demands that in fact sound similar to the previous year's request for a similarly small increase.

At this critical phase of its evolution, the Secret Service needs to take a different approach to budgeting. It needs to start over—not from last year's budget or a historical high-water mark. Rather, it has to build a new budget from the ground up by defining its mission, determining what it will take to achieve it, and asking for that. The mission is important enough to justify that approach.

(b)(5)

**Recommendation:** *The Secret Service needs to present a zero-based or mission-based budget that will provide sufficient resources to accomplish its mission, beginning immediately by working within DHS to adopt a workforce staffing model.*

### **3. Becoming a Learning Organization**

The next director needs to drive the Service to become an ever-learning, always-improving organization. It needs to become the kind of organization that can think critically about itself, capable of identifying and responding quickly to new gaps as they develop, and able to undertake the kind of big-picture review that is necessary in a world of evolving threats. The next director needs to engage the organization to constantly ask not just, "Is this piece working?" but also, "Are we as an organization continually staying ahead of those who pose threats to our mission?" The Secret Service needs to evolve, and evolve quickly.

#### **a. Learning from Employees**

(b)(5)

(b)(5) FBI Security engages its officers at the end of shifts or as supervisors make rounds, asking what the officers are seeing and what worries them; the Marine Corps requires Marines newly arrived at an embassy, who have fresh perspective, to look for gaps that could be exploited. To be sure, finding the right balance between chains of command and 360-degree feedback can be difficult in any security, law enforcement, or military organization. (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

**Recommendation:** *The Secret Service should create more opportunities for officers and agents to provide input on their mission and train its mid- and lower-level managers to encourage, value and respond to such feedback.*

**b. Learning from Federal Partners**

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

Recommendation: *The Secret Service needs to lead the federal protective force community.*

Recommendation: *The Secret Service should receive periodic, outside assessments of the threats to and strategies for protecting the White House compound.*

**c. Learning from International Peers**

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

Recommendation: *The Secret Service needs to resume participation in international fora with comparable protective services of friendly nations.*

**4. Insisting on Accountability**

The Secret Service asks a lot of its team. The organization asks its protective agents to stand in front of a bullet to protect the President. It expects its UD officers to maintain high alertness at every moment of a long shift. It requires its advance teams to scour massive new venues for the smallest weakness. The agency's zero-failure mission requires that its high standards be met.

In order for the Service's agents and officers to meet its high standards, they must see that the organization itself believes in its standards and enforces them in a consistent, evenhanded manner. In other words, agency leadership, managers, and front line supervisors must believe and show that they are accountable for their mission. These are not just morale issues, or issues of fairness or trust. Accountability creates the culture of performance that the Secret Service needs to meet its zero-failure mission.

**a. Accountability for Reforms**

The Secret Service will initiate a number of changes based on recent events. Some may come from this Report; others from within DSS, Congress, or the Executive Branch; and still others will be responsive to changes the next director determines are necessary.

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

**Recommendation:** *Secret Service leadership needs to give its priorities and reforms sustained attention, holding the agency accountable through to their completion.*

**b. Accountability for Discipline**

The Panel did not review individual past incidents in detail to determine whether appropriate discipline was imposed. [REDACTED] (b)(5)

[REDACTED]  
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**Recommendation:** *The Secret Service needs to implement its disciplinary system in a consistent manner that demonstrates zero tolerance for failures that are incompatible with its zero-failure mission.*

#### **c. Accountability for Performance**

Finally, the Secret Service's front-line supervisors need to do a better job holding their employees accountable for the performance of their mission. At both the UD's White House Branch posts and on PPD, the protective team needs to be constantly on edge and vigilant. As discussed elsewhere, the job is hard, and agents and officer need to improve constantly. Creating that culture of high performance requires reinforcement on a daily basis.

Shift leaders and other first-level supervisors can promote this kind of accountability in a number of ways, and they need to be held accountable for the performance and discipline of their teams. We heard from other law enforcement agencies, federal and state, on different techniques to enhance accountability in a way that supports the operational mission. In these agencies, roll calls are not just routine administrative gatherings, but opportunities to check equipment and check preparedness. Tabletop exercises, even brief ones, can be used to refresh knowledge of emergency protocols. Regular supervisor visits to posts are opportunities to quickly describe scenarios and test reactions.

To be ready for a job where quick reactions and reflexes are critical, supervisors need to drive home to their officers and agents that the front line is constantly being tested. Similarly, supervisors, including those at the most senior levels, need to be held accountable for the lapses of their personnel if such lapses could have been prevented.

**Recommendation:** *Front-line supervisors need to hold their forces accountable for performance by constantly testing readiness.*

### **B. The Director**

#### **1. The Next Director**

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5):(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

Recommendation: *The next director of the Secret Service should be a strong leader from outside the agency who has a protective, law enforcement or prosecutorial, or military background and who can drive cultural change in the organization and move the Secret Service forward into a new era.*

## 2. Future Leaders

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

Recommendation: *The Secret Service needs to establish a leadership development system that identifies and trains the agency's future managers and leaders.*

## VIII. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER REVIEWS

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

\* \* \*

(b)(5);(b)(7)(E)

These men and women deserve a Secret Service as dynamic, passionate, and eager for positive change as they are. Getting to that point, we believe, starts with new leadership from outside the organization who can catalyze the reforms necessary to ensure that the Service becomes an agency that constantly reevaluates its own performance and seeks to engage with and learn from others. Its personnel deserve the opportunities to train and test at levels commensurate with the difficulty of their mission. And it needs to make the most of innovative technologies that enable the force to combat an ever-evolving adversary more effectively.

The President, we are confident, remains safe in the hands of the Secret Service. To ensure that level of confidence is maintained long into the future, however, we believe that the Secret Service must commit itself to the kind of transformative, continuing change discussed in this Report.